By sending troops to Syria, the U.S. has prevented some key locations in that country from falling into the hands of the Russian-Iranian-Syrian alliance. But, with Islamic State deprived of its territory and rebel forces on the defensive, most of the country is now under the control of Moscow and/or Tehran. This result, argues Reuel Marc Gerecht, is a sign that the White House, while saying all the right things about the nature of the Islamic Republic, has done little to accomplish its own stated goals:

What Washington needs to do to roll back Iranian gains runs smack into what the Trump administration is prepared to do, which so far hasn’t been much. The president’s rhetoric against Iranian militancy has been tougher than Ronald Reagan’s or George W. Bush’s harshest orations. But Trump’s accomplishments on the ground have been few. The administration really has two options: to punish Iran economically or to roll back the mullahs militarily through the use of U.S. forces. . . .

To punish Iran economically, the White House could withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reinstate all of the sanctions waived by the nuclear deal. Or it could keep the accord, as it is doing, but launch a tsunami of executive-branch sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, effectively shutting off most of the trade and finance allowed by the JCPOA. Such actions would end the illogic of trying to push back against the Islamic Republic while fueling its economy. So far, the administration is doing neither. . . .

If [President Trump] walks away from his predecessor’s nuclear accord, however, the administration would have to be prepared for the clerical regime to test Washington’s resolve by openly reanimating parts of the nuclear program that had been slowed or dismantled. That means preventive military strikes, which the White House has so far shown no willingness to entertain. The same logic holds if Trump were to decide to deploy U.S. forces directly against Iran and its many Shiite militias in Syria: the nuclear deal most certainly will die when more than a handful of American soldiers perish.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.