A recent piece by an opinion writer for the New York Times argued that “liberal Zionism”—which the author seems to equate with support for a two-state solution—is dead, and that the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem is “another nail in [its] coffin.” Although this argument has rapidly been gaining ground, writes Emily Shire, it is entirely without merit:

[L]liberal Zionism and its preferred two-state solution have persisted in the face of a growing chorus of critics insisting a one-state solution is now inevitable. . . . Despite [the Times writer’s] and others’ accounts, reports of the death of liberal Zionism are greatly exaggerated.

But even though it lacks substantive support, the “liberal Zionism is dead” refrain is dangerous because it makes it easier to convince liberals that they should dispense with Zionism altogether—liberal or otherwise. Zionism is the basic support for Jewish sovereignty; it entails no specifications about two-state solutions, settlements or, for that matter, opinions of Benjamin Netanyahu. Yet when critics argue that Trump’s [announcement about moving the American embassy to Jerusalem] sounds the death knell for liberal Zionism, they are implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) making support for Israel a partisan issue.

[This line of reasoning] boosts the myth that liberalism and Zionism are mutually exclusive. . . . Moreover, it all but ensures that antipathy toward any form of Zionism will grow because it makes it easier to discount—or plainly demonize—the concept of Jewish sovereignty. The “liberal Zionism is dead” narrative insidiously lays the groundwork for people across the political spectrum to accept a world where Israel is dispensable.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”