Donate

The Recent Bombings in Sweden Highlight Europe’s Immigration Crisis

Jan. 29 2018

Last week, an explosive device went off in the Swedish city of Malmo—which has also been the location of many anti-Semitic incidents in recent years—and a police station was bombed in the same neighborhood the week before. Nobody was hurt in either instance, but, Sohrab Ahmari points out, if similar instances since October are added to the tally, Malmo has a frequency of bombings that puts it “in the same category as Mogadishu and Quetta.” And this is only part of a larger problem:

Long known for its tolerance and quality of life, [Sweden] has lately seen an alarming rise in gang violence, sexual assault, and terrorism—most of it linked to a large and unassimilated Muslim minority. There were more than 320 shootings and at least 110 murders in Sweden in 2017. . . . Rapes in 2017 were up 10 percent over the previous year, for a total of 7,226. . . .

There is no getting around the connections between Sweden’s crime wave and the country’s immigration-and-assimilation failures. . . . And yet its government, which likes to tout itself as the world’s “humanitarian superpower,” continues to extend an open-door invitation at a time when voters have run out of patience. Don’t be surprised if that frustration translates into significant ballot-box gains for the hard-right, neo-Nazi-linked Sweden Democrats come September’s parliamentary elections. When the responsible parties fail to deal with reality as it is, voters will turn to irresponsible ones.

Read more at Commentary

More about: Europe, European Islam, Immigration, Politics & Current Affairs, Sweden

How the U.S. Can Strike at Iran without Risking War

In his testimony before Congress on Tuesday, Michael Doran urged the U.S. to pursue a policy of rolling back Iranian influence in the Middle East, and explained how this can be accomplished. (Video of the testimony, along with the full text, are available at the link below.)

The United States . . . has indirect ways of striking at Iran—ways that do not risk drawing the United States into a quagmire. The easiest of these is to support allies who are already in the fight. . . . In contrast to the United States, Israel is already engaged in military operations whose stated goal is to drive Iran from Syria. We should therefore ask ourselves what actions we might take to strengthen Israel’s hand. Militarily, these might include, on the passive end of the spectrum, positioning our forces so as to deter Russian counterattacks against Israel. On the [more active] end, they might include arming and training Syrian forces to engage in operations against Iran and its proxies—much as we armed the mujahedin in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Diplomatically, the United States might associate itself much more directly with the red lines that Israel has announced regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. Israel has, for example, called for pushing Iran and its proxies away from its border on the Golan Heights. Who is prepared to say that Washington has done all in its power to demonstrate to Moscow that it fully supports this goal? In short, a policy of greater coordination with Jerusalem is both possible and desirable.

In Yemen, too, greater coordination with Saudi Arabia is worth pursuing. . . . In Lebanon and Iraq, conditions will not support a hard rollback policy. In these countries the goal should be to shift the policy away from a modus vivendi [with Iran] and in the direction of containment. In Iraq, the priority, of course, is the dismantling of the militia infrastructure that the Iranians have built. In Lebanon, [it should be] using sanctions to force the Lebanese banking sector to choose between doing business with Hizballah and Iran and doing business with the United States and its financial institutions. . . .

Iran will not take a coercive American policy sitting down. It will strike back—and it will do so cleverly. . . . It almost goes without saying that the United States should begin working with its allies now to develop contingency plans for countering the tactics [Tehran is likely to use]. I say “almost” because I know from experience in the White House that contingency planning is something we extol much more than we conduct. As obvious as these tactics [against us] are, they have often taken Western decision makers by surprise, and they have proved effective in wearing down Western resolve.

Read more at Hudson

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen