Amnesty for Islamic State Fighters Is Not the Answer

Now that Islamic State (IS) has lost much of its territory in Iraq and Syria, Western countries—and Western Europe especially—are seeing the beginning of the return of thousands of their citizens who had gone to the Middle East to fight for the caliphate. Robin Simcox urges governments not to be forgiving to these IS alumni:

Western governments should have no trouble figuring out what to do with citizens who have hacked off the heads of aid workers, committed mass rapes, pushed gay people off buildings, or tried to erase the presence of religious minorities. Killing them on the battlefield is one option. If they are captured, legally detaining them is another. And if these fighters do make it home, their home countries should prosecute them. . . . What should not be an option is to treat the returning terrorists with ever-greater levels of tolerance. Yet that is the option a number of Europeans advocate.

Take Denmark. Its much-vaunted “Aarhus model” sees returnees from Syria essentially welcomed back without censure. Danish authorities treat returning fighters as naïve youths. They may be offered public housing and counseling to help them readjust to life back in Denmark. . . .

It would be a grave mistake to forget that IS and its supporters have brought bloodshed around the world, subjugating Iraqis and Syrians and slaughtering innocents in New York, Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, and countless other cities. . . . The convergence of foreign fighters that occurred in Syria was highly destructive—and nothing new. That phenomenon is fast becoming the norm. To varying degrees, it also occurred in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. European governments did not prosecute such travelers, so it will doubtless happen again—unless Western governments crack down on citizens who have joined terrorist groups.

Read more at Washington Times

More about: Europe, ISIS, Politics & Current Affairs, Terrorism

 

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security