Last summer, terrorists affiliated with the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement—a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that operates within Israel—opened fire on border police on the Temple Mount. Since then, Israel has rolled up two cells loyal to Islamic State (IS) that were planning attacks on the al-Aqsa mosque. Nadav Shragai explains what has brought these two jihadist groups to agree on a common strategy:

The leader of the Northern Branch, Sheikh Raed Salah, envisions Jerusalem as the capital of an international Muslim caliphate [in the Middle East]. . . . Islamic State and its supporters, by contrast, have never limited or defined the borders of the future caliphate, or named a capital for it. After their defeats in Syria and Iraq, the issues of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa are, for them, a new horizon—or at least a potential one.

The way that the Northern Branch sees it, the story about al-Aqsa’s being in danger, [a regular theme of its propaganda], is a tool to recruit the masses, and al-Aqsa itself is a place that must be “redeemed from the Jewish desecration” and “freed from its bonds.” . . . For the small cluster of Arab Israeli supporters of Islamic State, al-Aqsa is everything that the Northern Branch says it is, and more: it is a tool that IS can use to spread and promote the idea of an Islamic state, and active war against Jews and Christians—“the new heretics and Crusaders.” . . .

As in July 2017, each of the cells [recently broken up by Israeli police] included three young men from [the northern Israeli village of] Umm al-Fahm, some of whom [likewise] belonged to the Jabarin clan. . . . It’s not hard to picture what would happen if two IS cells from Jabarin, linked by family ties, were to execute an attack. In the Middle East, the Temple Mount is the ultimate powder keg. Any fire that breaks out there spreads quickly and is very difficult to put out. In previous incidents, the spinners of the “al-Aqsa is in danger” yarn found a way to foist responsibility for the attacks onto Israel, as the entity that “rules over Islamic holy sites.”

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.