In February, the two firms that own the rights to the natural-gas fields beneath Israel’s coastal waters signed a deal to begin exporting gas to an Egyptian company, which will then liquefy it for export and domestic consumption. Oded Eran, Elai Rettig, and Ofir Winter explain that, although the deal is not without its risks—especially since any pipeline could be vulnerable to attack by Hamas, Hizballah, or Islamic State—it will likely improve relations among Israel and its neighbors:

Egypt offers Israel a growing local market [for its gas] and the possibility of using its liquefaction facilities, [the only such facilities in the region], to transport gas to Europe. . . . Apart from the pipeline to Egypt, a pipeline to Jordan is [also] under construction, as part of an agreement signed in 2016 to supply 45-billion cubic meters of gas over fifteen years. . . .

The deals with Jordan and Egypt have great strategic value for Israel and the region. They might possibly be joined by a future deal with the Palestinian Authority (PA). . . . These agreements stabilize Israel’s relations with its neighbors by creating a web of mutual interests and opening up the possibility of regional cooperation beyond the subject of natural gas, such as the export and import of electricity and desalinated water.

In security terms, the flow of gas from Israel to Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority makes this a regional and not just Israeli interest. . . . [A]ny damage by Hizballah or Hamas to Israel’s ability to produce gas will also affect the supply of electricity to Jordan, Egypt, and the PA. The threat will become an important component in intelligence and security cooperation among neighboring countries in identifying and preventing sabotage, and a catalyst for them to seek calm if fighting breaks out with one of these [terror] organizations. In economic terms, [a successful] partnership between Israel and its neighbors with regard to energy resources will encourage the entry of new investors into the eastern Mediterranean and show them that it is possible to implement large-scale production and export projects requiring regional cooperation.

The deal could also have implications regarding the . . . unresolved dispute between Israel and Lebanon over maritime borders, [which] is a political and security nuisance for Israel [but] has not prevented either Egypt or Jordan from entering into long-term engagements with Israel in the field of energy. Clearly, hostilities between Israel and Lebanon would have destructive consequences, particularly for Lebanon, inter alia by reducing its ability to use the oil and gas in its waters, but they would also damage Israeli interests regarding the development of gas reservoirs close to the border. [Therefore], it would be best for countries that have diplomatic relations with Lebanon, particularly those whose energy companies are involved in gas development, to work toward reducing the bellicose rhetoric currently coming from Beirut.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.