When It Comes to North Korea, Stopping Its Supply of Weapons to the Middle East Should Be a Priority

In 2007, Israeli planes destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria that was a near-exact replica of a North Korean one and was manned by North Korean technicians; Iran’s most sophisticated missiles are variants of North Korean models; some of Syria’s chemical weapons were most likely developed with North Korean help as well. With Washington-Pyongyang talks expected to take place in the near future, writes Jay Solomon, the U.S. must pressure the Communist regime to cease providing such deadly weapons to rogue regimes:

On March 21, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security released a report calling for UN inspectors to visit a site near the western Syrian town of al-Qusayr, noting that the Assad regime may have built a uranium-enrichment facility there with Pyongyang’s assistance. . . . In a [separate], confidential report, UN inspectors describe how North Korean trade companies smuggled tons of industrial equipment into Syria in recent years for what appeared to be the construction of a new chemical-weapons production facility. . . .

U.S. defense officials are also worried that the North Koreans are learning from the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons, perhaps in case they need to resort to chemical attacks if conflict breaks out on the Korean peninsula. Washington believes that Pyongyang is more than willing to use such weapons, claiming that VX nerve agent was the instrument of choice when Kim Jong Un ordered the assassination of his half-brother last year in Malaysia. . . .

North Korea and Iran have been cooperating on missile development since the 1980s, according to U.S. and Israeli officials. . . . To date, however, U.S., European, and UN officials say there is no smoking-gun evidence of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. . . .

According to current and former U.S. officials, however, it is unclear what the administration could offer Pyongyang in return for cutting off one of the country’s primary revenue sources. To be sure, North Korea is eager to roll back the punishing international sanctions, particularly those targeting its mineral and agricultural exports. . . . [But] the suspected depths of North Korea’s economic ills mean that Kim will likely continue marketing his wares to bad actors in the Middle East, unless President Trump proves willing or able to offer him a sufficiently enticing alternative.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Chemical weapons, Iran, North Korea, Nuclear proliferation, Syria, U.S. Foreign policy

Israel Just Sent Iran a Clear Message

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.

Read more at Jewish Chronicle

More about: Iran, Israeli Security