For decades, America’s refusal to establish its embassy in Israel’s capital has been justified on the grounds that moving it there would unleash Arab violence. Hillel Frisch notes that, four months after the White House announced the move, such fears have been exposed as unfounded:

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, probably the most reputable source of data on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has for many years tabulated significant Palestinian terrorist attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. . . . There were thirteen attacks, [according to Amit], in the period before the decision [to move the embassy] (that is, from August to early December 2017), compared with fourteen attacks from December 2017 to early April 2018. The number of terrorist attacks in both four-month periods paled before the period covering April through July 2017, in which there were 38 attacks, considerably more than the two periods together since then. . . .

But perhaps data for serious terrorist attacks are not the appropriate measure to assess instability? . . . The number of arrests Israel makes is [probably a better] indicator of levels of other forms of violence and protest. . . . Addameer, a Palestinian NGO concerned with the welfare of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, records . . . the total number of prisoners in Israeli detention centers on a monthly basis. The numbers through March 2018 show no significant increase. . . . If anything, the figures indicate a slight decline in arrests.

Perhaps the best indication that President Trump’s decision did not bring Palestinians to confront Israeli security in the streets is Hamas’s “March of Return” campaign that began at the end of March on “Land Day” and is supposed to continue up to May 14, the date of the establishment of the state of Israel, which Palestinians call “the Nakba,” the catastrophe. If Trump’s decision was so inflammatory, why the need for a new campaign theme to mobilize Palestinians to violence?

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.