When international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program were still in place, Chinese businesses found elaborate ways to circumvent them, at least partially. And once the 2015 nuclear agreement—to which China is a party—removed those sanctions, these businesses were in a position to capitalize on the opening of Iranian markets. Now that Washington has withdrawn from the deal and re-imposed sanctions, it seems unlikely that Beijing will want to abide by them. James Dorsey, however, thinks it possible that China will have no choice:

[T]his time around, rejecting and violating U.S. sanctions may prove—for China as well as the other signatories—to be a trickier undertaking. Last time, Beijing and the other [future] signatories [to the nuclear deal] were part of an international consensus that aimed at forcing Tehran to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, even if they at times circumvented the sanctions.

China and the other signatories are now likely to be operating in a far more confrontational environment. The subtext of President Trump’s decision [to withdraw from the deal], as well as the positions taken by Saudi Arabia and Israel, appears to be a policy that seeks to achieve regime change in Tehran. Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates recently suggested that they are willing to . . . sanction those who fail to support them in their eleven-month-old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar. There is little reason to doubt that they would do the same in their confrontation with Iran. . . .

In Beijing’s case, its concerted effort to remain above the fray of the Middle East’s multiple conflicts could be severely compromised if it were forced to take sides in a conflict between Iran, a country with which Beijing feels it has much in common and that it has assisted in developing its ballistic and nuclear programs, and Riyadh, a newer friend that is economically important to the People’s Republic. . . .

[Of course, a complication is that] Saudi Arabia desperately needs foreign investment, and China, moreover, is one of Saudi Arabia’s foremost oil-export markets. While the Saudi military remains focused on U.S. and European arms purchases, Beijing—at a time when a military confrontation between the kingdom and Iran is not beyond the realm of the possible—is a source of weaponry the U.S. has been unwilling to sell to Saudis so far.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.