Surveying the entire history of the Jewish state’s relations with the Soviet Union and then Russia from 1948 to the present, Micky Aharonson investigates some of its many paradoxes. Most recently and notably, these include the two countries’ close military contacts and maintenance of at least a façade of friendship despite the fact that their strategic interests in Syria are diametrically opposed. Also, there is Moscow’s persistently expressed opposition to Sunni Muslim terrorist groups coupled with its diplomatic recognition of Hamas’s Sunni terrorist regime in Gaza:

Russian policy on the Palestinian issue and relations with the various Palestinian organizations are directly related to its interests in the Middle East and its desire to achieve the status of a superpower that mediates in regional negotiations. In recent years, Russia has . . . proposed an international conference in Moscow to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the participation of all the involved parties. . . .

Russia was [also] the first country to recognize the Hamas government in Gaza and received Hamas representatives for an official visit to Moscow. . . . The Russians have continued over the years to maintain open dialogue with Hamas. According to the Russians, their goal is to [integrate Hamas into the peace process] and to [garner its] support for the PLO and an Arab peace initiative. . . . In contrast to the [U.S. and even the EU], it did not . . . define [Hamas] as a terror organization. . . . This attitude is not the result of any particular sympathy for the organization but rather the Russian fear of a change in leadership by external intervention. The Russians are consistent in adopting [this] line . . . out of fear that such events will become legitimate in other [countries as well], including Russia itself.

Hamas, however, is not the main obstacle to Russo-Israeli concord:

Russia has an economic and even strategic interest in selling advanced weaponry and nuclear capability to countries that constitute a direct threat to Israel, while Israel has an economic and strategic interest in the sale of advanced weaponry to countries that are militarily and strategically sensitive from Russia’s viewpoint. [I]n the Second Lebanon War, for example, Hizballah made use of weapons provided by Russia to Syria, including Kornet and Metis missiles, which managed to damage even the latest model of Israel’s Merkava tank. . . . [T]he media later reported that Russia had provided intelligence to Hizballah during the war and that the Russian communication station on the Syrian border conveyed information to Hizballah forces. Since those events, Israel has continued to warn Russia—at dozens of meetings and at all diplomatic levels—of the “leakage” of weapons that had been shipped to Syria or Russian weapons that make their way from Iran into the hands of Hizballah. . . .

Russia for its part is highly sensitive to the sale of military knowhow and advanced weapons by Israel to former Soviet countries with which Russia has [poor] relations. Georgia is a prime example. In 2008, during the war between Russia and Georgia, Russia accused Israel of supporting Georgia by supplying it with arms. . . .

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.