As Assad Drives Rebels from Southwestern Syria, What Are Israel’s Obligations to Recipients of Its Aid There?

This week, Bashar al-Assad’s forces, along with those of his allies, began an offensive in the southwestern part of Syria in violation of the “deconfliction zone” established there by Russia and the U.S. If the offensive succeeds, it will bring Iran-backed troops, including Hizballah, right up to the Israeli and Jordanian borders. The territory under assault, moreover, is now held by rebel groups to whom Jerusalem has been providing humanitarian and occasionally even military aid. Eran Lerman and Nir Boms consider Israel’s obligations to these allies:

The relevant question is not whether Israel has a formal obligation to assist [these rebel groups]. These are informal arrangements formed over the course of years and originating in the immediate needs of residents of the region adjacent to the border. Nevertheless, their fate carries ethical, symbolic, and strategic significance. The ramifications of what could happen go beyond the ethical [dimension] and could determine the extent to which Israel is perceived—both in its immediate strategic environment and in the international arena—as a country whose commitment can be relied upon. . . .

Israel may not be able to stem the tide of the assault on the rebel forces in the south. But it would at least be fitting for it to take responsibility and determine the fate of those who have acted on its side and with its assistance. There are ways (even by means of conducting a dialogue through the Russians) of seeing to the welfare of the rebels who consented to work with [Israel] during the past five years and to the properties that might be left behind, including clinics, hospitals, rescue teams, and orphanages. If [necessary], Israel must see to . . . the evacuation of people who might be made an example of for collaborating with it. . . .

Israel must also prepare for a situation in which Syrian refugees and rebels march on the border fence out of fear for their lives (as was the case with the South Lebanon Army in 2000).

Taking this responsibility is not just a moral [obligation]—it is also a political imperative which would have a considerable effect on a fluctuating Middle East, which is examining Israel’s course of action and slowly [reconsidering its attitudes]. Israel must continue doing the right thing, even if doing so involves complex difficulties of implementation.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies

More about: Hizballah, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security, Jordan, Syrian civil war

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF