Does Russia Want Iran Out of Syria? No

Despite recent statements from Moscow calling on foreign forces to leave Syria, Eyal Zisser believes that the Islamic Republic’s troops and proxies will be staying in-country, without objection from Vladimir Putin:

[I]n contrast to the reports in the Israeli media, neither Putin nor Bashar al-Assad asked the Iranians to leave Syria at all. Indeed, the Russian president called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Syrian soil. First and foremost, however, he was referring to American forces, which still control one-quarter of Syrian territory, mostly in the Kurdish areas in the northeast, and which also grant protection to the rebels in the country’s south. The Russians would also like the Turks to leave the areas they control in Syria’s north. Finally, they want Israel to let Assad retake control of the Syrian Golan Heights and the country’s south, and to eradicate the rebels whom, until recently, Jerusalem has supported.

Iran isn’t in Russia’s crosshairs, because Moscow doesn’t see it as a competitor or adversary (for now, at least). Iran is simply the vessel the Russians use to advance their goals in Syria.

The Russians understand Israel’s concerns pertaining to Iran. They also don’t want Israel to . . . pummel the Assad regime, which they have all but dragged to the finish line and victory. Hence they are willing to facilitate efforts to remove Iranian forces from the Golan border, a demand they believe the Iranians can accept—as a temporary, confined concession on the path to Tehran’s greater goal of establishing a permanent foothold in Syria. . . .

This doesn’t mean that Russia and Iran aren’t competing or that inherent tensions don’t exist; both want to control Syria when the civil war ends. We can assume that Assad, too, will eventually wish to rid his country of Iran’s invasive presence and influence in Syria’s internal affairs, which threatens to permeate all government institutions, the army, and even the [ruling] Alawite sect. Assad also won’t want the Iranians to embroil him in a clash with Israel. [But] he’ll cross that bridge when he gets there. For now, and certainly in the weeks and months ahead, Assad and Putin both need the Iranians. After all, next to the Russian jets in the air, the tide of the war was turned, and the survival of Assad regime ensured, by Iranian and Hizballah forces on the ground.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, Politics & Current Affairs, Russia, Syrian civil war

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF