Last month, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq (KRG) signed a deal with Russia’s state-owned energy company, Rosneft, to extract and export natural gas from its territory. To Anna Borshchevskaya and Bilal Wahab, the deal is evidence that the KRG, losing faith in the U.S., is seeking Russian protection instead. Iraqi Kurds have felt betrayed by Washington since September 2017, when the America allowed Iran-backed militias to crush their bid for independence. Borshchevskaya and Wahab write:

From a purely economic standpoint, Moscow’s decision [to invest in Kurdistan] seems to make little sense, until one considers that Vladimir Putin views energy deals primarily as a foreign-policy tool. . . . [Also], it is important to remember that [Russia’s] relationship with the Kurds goes back about 200 years. Russia understood their importance during the days of Catherine the Great and began acting as their patron—while cynically using them toward its own ends. This pattern is apparently resurfacing with Putin. . . .

Erbil needs to be careful about its choice of bedfellows in the longer term. . . . In Syria, Moscow allowed Turkey to attack Kurdish forces and drive them from Afrin. And in Iraq, Russian energy companies may be using their operations in the KRG as a mere temporary lever to pry better contract terms out of Baghdad. Embracing internationally sanctioned Russian firms also goes against the aspirations of the Kurdish electorate, who have called for better governance and economic reform. More broadly, unlike the United States, Moscow has no regard for rule of law and human rights, so its patronage could be bad news for the Kurdish public.

In Washington, some officials may not consider rapprochement with the KRG to be urgent now that the fight against Islamic State is winding down, especially given Erbil’s decision to ignore U.S. warnings [against holding last year’s] referendum. Yet they should understand that so long as the future U.S. role in the Middle East remains unclear, more local actors will look to Russia as the main alternative for their survival, at potentially great harm to long-term U.S. interests.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.