As the U.S. has increased economic pressure on Iran and made clear that it is considering increased political and military pressure as well, Israel has used superior air power and intelligence to destroy Iranian military installations in Syria. When, last week, the Gaza-based terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad began launching rockets and mortars at Israeli civilians, was it acting on the orders of a Tehran eager to push back? Jonathan Spyer writes:

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a wholly owned franchise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While the apparent “motive” for its commencement of rocket fire was the killing of three of its militants by the IDF after a failed IED attack, this incident would not normally have been of sufficient magnitude to generate the largest barrage of rockets since Operation Protective Edge in 2014. It is therefore probable that the escalation in Gaza . . . was an example of Iran’s ability to mobilize a proxy on one front to place pressure on an adversary in response to events taking place in another arena.

Yet [last] week’s events also demonstrate Iran’s limitations. Hamas itself is not a wholly owned franchise of Tehran. And the joint interest of Israel, Hamas, and Egypt in avoiding a descent to a 2014-style conflagration served to put a lid on the escalation. . . .

Further east, however, in the . . . 30 percent of Syria east of the Euphrates, the Iranians may find an arena more to their liking. Here, a fledgling, U.S.-associated and Kurdish-dominated [political] authority rules over a population of about 4 million people, including many Sunni Arabs. In this situation, the IRGC’s methods of agitation, assassinations, and fomenting unrest from below are directly relevant.

Unidentified gunmen are already operating in this area. A prominent Kurdish official, Omar Alloush, was assassinated on March 15. Graffiti denouncing [Kurdish leaders] has appeared in the Arab-majority city of Raqqa. . . . More broadly, while Israeli air action may make the Iranians think twice about deploying heavy-weapons systems in Syria, the broader Iranian project of establishing local client militias and stationing proxy forces on Syria soil remains largely untouched and invulnerable to Israeli air action. . . .

[In Iraq as well], the evidence of recent years shows that where Iran enjoys an advantage over its rivals in such arenas is in its greater ability to utilize paramilitary and terrorist methods. . . . Iran is strongest in Lebanon and Assad-controlled Syria, powerful and dangerous in Iraq, and potentially so in the Kurdish-controlled . . . part of Syria, and weaker and with fewer options in Yemen and Gaza.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.