Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Iran has used its intervention on behalf of Bashar al-Assad to establish a military foothold in the country for itself and its Lebanese proxy, Hizballah. Fearing that Tehran is planning to turn this into a new front for attacking the Jewish state, the IDF has conducted numerous attacks on Iranian and Iran-allied positions in Syria. Tony Badran, Matthew R.J. Brodsky, and Jonathan Schanzer explain recent developments in Israeli strategy and outline how the U.S. can best assist its most important Middle Eastern ally:

Unlike in past strikes against Hizballah-bound weapons, when Israeli officials have remained mum and refused to accept responsibility, the IDF is now openly claiming credit for strikes against Iranian assets. . . .

For now, Hizballah appears willing, or perhaps forced, to absorb such blows. The Lebanese terror group understands that while Israel is stopping some weapons from getting through, it certainly is not stopping all. This has yielded an unspoken understanding between Israel and Hizballah: that Israel can strike repeatedly in Syria so long as it does not hit targets inside Lebanon. These rules effectively extend the period of calm between major wars in Lebanon—a shared preference for both Hizballah and Israel. . . .

[Since last fall, however], Israel has upped the tempo of its targeting campaign. . . . Declaring open season on Iran in Syria is now, without question, the Israeli strategy. It marks an expansion of Jerusalem’s longstanding policy of interdicting weapons shipments to Hizballah with the aim of forestalling the next war in Lebanon. This [expanded] posture signals to the Iranians and Hizballah that Israel is determined to destroy Iran’s significant military buildup in Syria. But more importantly, the Israeli leadership has signaled that, if it must, it is prepared to go to war. . . .

The Trump administration should make countering Iran its priority in the region. In practice, . . . the U.S. should deny Iran an operational line of communication on the ground between Iraq and Syria. To that end, it should maintain the American base at al-Tanf on the Jordanian border . . . [Furthermore], the administration should continue and intensify its sanctions against Iran [and also] impose maximum economic pressure against the Assad regime in response to its war crimes and ongoing human-rights abuses. . . .

Chaos has been building in Syria for years. To date, it has remained largely controlled and confined. But Iran’s efforts to change the equation represent a strategic threat. To prevent a war with Iran and its proxies, Israel has paradoxically had little choice but to escalate. The United States should unreservedly and publicly support Israel’s position. In so doing, it will not only deter Russia and help to degrade Iranian power, but it will also advance its own interests.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.