The U.S. Shouldn’t Tolerate Turkey’s Hostage-Taking

On Wednesday, giving in only partially to pressure from the Trump administration, the Turkish government transferred the American pastor Andrew Brunson—held for two years on fictitious charges of terrorism—from prison to house arrest. Brunson fell victim to the mass detentions in the wake of the abortive coup two years ago. But he is not the only prisoner Washington should concern itself with, argue Henri Barkey and Eric Edelman: three Turkish nationals employed by the U.S. State Department have also been detained:

[Such] “foreign-service nationals” . . . form the backbone of U.S. diplomatic efforts abroad. No American embassy or consulate could operate without them. The three men have been detained in Turkey on bogus charges. Two are in jail, and one is under house arrest. As with tens of thousands of others imprisoned by the Turkish authorities in recent years, the charges against them are the product of paranoid conspiracy theories that beggar the imagination. . . .

The unwillingness of Washington to apply public pressure on Turkey to release these State Department employees sends an alarming message to the other local staff in Turkey: they are all subject to intimidation and pressure from Turkish authorities, and their employer doesn’t have their back. In effect, Turkish intelligence now has leverage over part of U.S. operations, shattering diplomatic conventions. Many of these local employees have resigned. Worse, the Turks’ actions may be copied by other authoritarian states that notice the U.S. government’s indifference.

It is quite possible that Erdogan will release Brunson [since] Turkey may soon need help from the United States, a NATO ally, if its ailing economy slides into a meltdown. Brunson’s release would be welcome, but it would also present a danger that the U.S. government would consider the matter of unjustified detentions resolved—condemning [the foreign-service employees] to years in Turkish jails.

Congress has an opportunity to play an important role here. A new U.S. ambassador to Turkey is likely to be nominated soon. The Senate should use the confirmation process to hold the administration accountable for the safety and security of all State Department employees. . . . A U.S. failure to show that it stands by its people will cripple the State Department’s ability to represent America overseas. Either foreign-service nationals are on the U.S. team, or they are not.

Read more at Washington Post

More about: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, State Department, Turkey, U.S. Foreign policy

 

Yes, Iran Wanted to Hurt Israel

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.

Read more at Institute for the Study of War

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, Missiles, War in Ukraine