What the Downing of a Syrian Fighter Jet Says about Russian Guarantees

On Tuesday, a Syrian fighter jet crossed into Israeli airspace, where it was promptly shot down by a Patriot missile. In all likelihood the plane’s mission was to attack Islamic State positions not far from the Israel-Syrian border, and it strayed into Israel’s skies by accident. The IDF, for its part, acted in accordance with its established policy of responding to any violations of the country’s borders, intentional or not. The incident comes on the heels of apparent Russian and American promises to uphold the 1974 Israel-Syria armistice agreement, which the Syrian pilot broke. Yet, writes Oded Granot, the scenario Jerusalem faces across the border is far graver than stray fighter jets:

[T]he fact that Syrian and Russian jets have carried out numerous bombing runs in recent days near [Israel’s] border, in an effort to defeat the rebels in the country’s southwest, means Israel can hardly ignore the potential dangers. . . . [I]t’s obvious that the swift fall of Syria’s southwestern province of Deraa in recent weeks and the Syrian army’s rapid advance toward Israel’s border on the Golan has exponentially heightened the IDF’s readiness and considerably exacerbated anxieties in Jerusalem. At the current pace after the fall of Deraa, taking Quneitra—which literally touches the Israeli border—is only a matter of days or weeks.

Israel’s position regarding the return of the Syrian army to the Golan Heights was made clear to all the relevant parties. It insists on strictly upholding the 1974 armistice and will have a zero-tolerance policy toward any violation of the agreement. In this context, downing the Syrian jet on Tuesday could be viewed as a reminder of Israel’s determination to preserve its red lines on the Golan at all costs.

The issue is that even if the Syrian army adheres to honoring the armistice agreement, Israel’s main problem was and remains the presence of Iranian forces in Syria. Although an official Russian source on Tuesday denied that Israel had rejected Moscow’s offer to keep the Iranians 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the Israeli border, everyone understands that this offer isn’t satisfactory. It will enable the Iranians to continue solidifying their foothold in Syria and station long-range missiles on its soil, and it will not prevent pro-Iranian elements—for instance, Hizballah and Shiite militias—from embedding themselves within the Syrian army and taking up positions on the other side of the border fence.

To be sure, Vladimir Putin is not a huge fan of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but as of now he is apparently unwilling to clash with the Iranians and demand their complete withdrawal from Syria. Under these circumstances, Israel’s self-proclaimed commitment to keeping Iran out of Syria isn’t a simple prospect, nor is it easy to implement.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Iran, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security, Russia, Syria

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF