While the U.S. has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as the nuclear agreement with Tehran is formally known—the Islamic Republic’s response still remains unclear. Michael Herzog believes it unlikely that the ayatollahs will be content either to do nothing or to renegotiate the terms of the deal. He writes:

The more likely scenario is that Iran will resume its nuclear activities with regard to [uranium] enrichment, albeit slowly and gradually, at each phase [observing] the international and domestic response [before] deciding how to proceed. There is a range of activities they can undertake, starting with the . . . less risky part of the spectrum, and then possibly escalating. The more extreme measures of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stopping all cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), kicking out inspectors, and going underground with its nuclear program are less likely in the foreseeable future because they enhance the risk of a U.S. or Israeli military response and they will bring about loss of European support.

More likely is that Iran decides to enrich uranium up to 20 percent using new types of centrifuges and continues to work with the IAEA on its own terms—allowing limited inspections of declared sites. As major sanctions are kicking in regardless, the Iranians don’t have much to lose economically, but their continued cooperation with the IAEA may make it harder [for Israel or the U.S.] to decide on military action against them.

Once Iran resumes its nuclear program outside the scope of the JCPOA, both the U.S. and Israel will have to redefine their red lines concerning the Iranian nuclear program, namely where to draw a line, the crossing of which would trigger a military response against Iran. . . .

[O]ne also has to follow carefully the unfolding diplomatic process between the U.S. and North Korea. Everyone, including the Iranians, is watching very closely, and the situation in the Middle East will be [affected] by what develops in the Korean peninsula. If there is a real agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea, including credible inspections inside the country, then this will strengthen the U.S.’s hand vis-à-vis Iran. If, on the other hand, a weak deal with North Korea emerges that leaves its [nuclear] infrastructure and capabilities in place, this may strengthen the Iranians vis-à-vis the international community.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.