Benjamin Netanyahu, writes Michael Mandelbaum, might be the most successful leader in the democratic world today. During his tenure as prime minister—which, if he stays in office another year, will be even longer than even David Ben-Gurion’s—there have been, on average, fewer Israeli deaths per year from war and terrorism than under that of any of his predecessors. And despite having come to office (for the second time) in 2009, in the midst of a global recession, he’s presided over a period of remarkable economic growth. Still, he is anything but loved:

[F]or all his accomplishments [Netanyahu] is unusually unpopular. In Israel the political party that he leads, the Likud, has won less than one-quarter of the popular vote in the last three general elections, forcing him to assemble parliamentary coalitions in order to govern. Even many who vote for him—as anyone with a circle of Israeli acquaintances can attest—express serious reservations about him personally. Those on the left of the country’s political spectrum despise him. . . . Beyond Israel, Netanyahu’s unpopularity soars. . . .

Why . . . has someone with such achievements in both policy and politics earned the scorn, indeed, the hatred, of so many? Part of the answer lies in his longevity. Anyone in office, especially at the highest level, accumulates adversaries over the years. . . . In addition, Netanyahu and his wife Sara have displayed a penchant for luxurious living in a country founded on spartan ideals. They both stand accused, moreover, . . . of corruption. Mrs. Netanyahu has been indicted for misusing public funds and her husband is the subject of several investigations for similar misdeeds, which in the worst-case scenario could put an end to his political career.

While important to Israelis, these personal matters do not explain the low regard in which the prime minister is held in other countries. For this there is one major reason, which also has a great deal to do with the dislike Israelis on the left have for him as well as the willingness of their non-left-wing compatriots to keep him in office: the peace process. In the quarter-century since Yitzḥak Rabin and the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, signed the Oslo Accords, . . . Israelis and Palestinians have failed to make peace. The responsibility for that failure belongs to the Palestinians. . . .

The Palestinians have clearly demonstrated that they are not, to use the common phrase, “a partner for peace.” . . . If the efforts of his predecessors came to naught, it is odd, to say the least, to blame Netanyahu for not following in their footsteps. Yet the Israeli left and Western governments do blame him; and from that blame comes their disdain for him.

The wider Israeli public, however, living as it does next to the Palestinians and well aware of their 25-year record, knows where the responsibility for the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies. It also knows that, whatever his shortcomings, Netanyahu understands this basic fact of Middle Eastern life while his opponents at home and abroad do not. The public has confidence that he will not launch naïve and perhaps dangerous initiatives in an effort to please his domestic and foreign critics. That is why it has voted to keep him in power.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.