Since becoming Turkey’s prime minister in 2003, now-President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has systematically undermined his country’s alliance with the Jewish state and moved in an increasingly Islamist and anti-American direction. Philip Terzian argues that the country is unlikely to revert to its former position.

[W]hile Erdogan exercises considerably more arbitrary personal power than Emmanuel Macron or Donald Trump, he may aptly be described as a product of Turkish democracy, which of course renders Turkey’s evolution more disturbing. It would be comforting to believe that Erdogan’s thuggish autocracy and reflexive anti-Americanism—not to mention anti-Semitism—were reflections of a single, expendable politician. But they are not. . . . [I]f public opinion polls are to be believed, the United States is not just unpopular in Turkey but overwhelmingly reviled, an attitude that long antedates the advent of President Trump. . . .

Erdogan’s statecraft and Turkey’s behavior generate predictions that would have been unthinkable—very nearly unmentionable—a decade ago. In particular, Turkey’s continued membership in NATO is an open question. . . . Turkish policies facilitated the growth and nourishment of Islamic State, allowing its fighters to pass through Turkey with impunity. And Turkey’s ongoing war against its Kurdish minority has not just hampered America’s war on terror—preventing access to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq via Turkey’s border during the Iraq war—but has brought it close to open conflict with U.S. forces in northern Syria. . . .

[Even worse], Erdogan has now turned his attention toward Moscow, where he seeks to purchase Russian missiles for Turkey’s air defenses. Inasmuch as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 as a Western bulwark against Soviet expansion, the notion of a NATO member in 2018 integrating its defenses with Moscow’s must necessarily concentrate minds in Brussels. And in Washington, too.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.