While Saudi Arabia’s King Salman seems to trust his son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, with most policy decisions, the two seem to differ when it comes to the Palestinians: the king’s statements seem much more supportive of their position than the prince’s. This difference, writes Haisam Hassanein, reflects a deeper generational divide in Saudi public opinion. (Free registration required.)

Older Saudis grew up in the 1950s and 1960s during the heyday of Arab nationalism, and its embrace of the Palestinian cause. . . . While the Saudis never fully embraced Arab nationalism, they adopted the Palestinian cause to preempt attacks . . . from their arch-opponents, Arab nationalists. . . . However, the younger generations, characterized and led by Mohammad bin Salman and his close ally Mohamed bin Zayed—the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the primary driver of the United Arab Emirates’ foreign policy—[don’t share this view]. . . .

[The two princes] realize that Palestinians in general are not . . . supporters of Saudi and Emirati interests with regard to checking the power of political Shiite Islamists, most notably Iran, and Sunni political Islamists, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood. . . . [O]ver the last few years, their position has been increasingly adopted first by younger elites and then more broadly, not least as Saudi Arabia itself has come under missile attack from Iranian proxies. . . .

[T]he younger Gulf generations . . . believe it is [most] likely that a fully independent Palestinian state would itself be hostage to radical forces and would in fact become an extreme source of instability in the region. [Indeed, the two princes] believe that establishing a Palestinian state would mean handing Iran and Sunni political Islamists another Arab capital to control and influence. Iranian influence among Palestinian groups has solidified over the years, and the crown princes’ assessment is that it is irreversible. [They] are not foolish enough to lobby for and fund the establishment of a state that would most certainly be an Iranian client state. . . .

Despite this, many Western policymakers still fantasize about the idea that the Gulf countries could provide money to create and develop a Palestinian state—indeed, this is reportedly one of the founding principles of the Trump-Kushner peace plan. That is never going to happen. Those who actively dictate policy in the Gulf are convinced that every dollar the Saudis give to the Palestinians will ultimately go to Iran. The Saudis and Emirates are likely to promise to provide financial assistance in public, but U.S. policymakers should not believe that they would ever deliver when push really comes to shove.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.