Thousands of Gazans gathered at the border fence on Tuesday night, throwing rocks, burning tires, and launching incendiary devices attached to kites and balloons. Meanwhile, Egypt is still trying to broker a truce between Hamas and Israel, while Israeli politicians are considering steps to improve the economic and humanitarian situation in the Strip—such as expanding fishermen’s access to coastal waters or building a port—in order to end the rioting. Hillel Frisch argues that ever since the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, there has been no correlation between economic improvements in the territory and reductions in terror.

If humanitarian gestures had in fact led in the past decade to a reduction of violence, there should be a visible correlation between low levels of missile launchings and the following: 1) a high number of trucks full of produce moving into Gaza, 2) a high number of trucks full of Gazan exports moving out, and 3) a high number of Gazans allowed to travel to Israel or beyond for business and healthcare. . . .

The findings between 2012 and 2014 are [especially] telling. The number of trucks increased [in these years]. According to the humanitarian argument, the number of missile launchings should then have decreased—but [instead] launchings in the first half of 2014 vastly increased, leading to the most lethal and long-term bout of conflict to date. Hamas does not appear to be swayed in the least by humanitarian gestures. . . .

[Instead, in today’s circumstances], Hamas calculated first that Israel had moved many of its Iron Dome [missile-defense batteries] north to the Golan, rendering Israel’s south more vulnerable; and second that Israel would be restrained from reacting in a massive way so as to preserve the focus on Iran, especially the oil sanctions that the U.S. will impose on that country in November.

It was a good gamble. Hamas achieved both the restoration of the status quo that had prevailed before the March of Return [as the protests, riots, and attacks that have been going on at the border fence for the past six months are known] and Israeli acquiescence in Hamas violence during the March—violence that is primarily designed to secure a prisoner deal that will free hundreds in return for the release of two Israeli citizens and the remains of two others. If no progress is made toward a prisoner release on Hamas’s terms, violence will likely continue no matter how much the economic welfare of the inhabitants of Gaza is improved.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.