Despite the accumulating evidence to the contrary, Russian officials have stuck with their story that Israel is responsible for last week’s accidental downing of a Russian plane by Syria. Moreover, Moscow announced that it will provide its Syrian allies with the S-300 antiaircraft missile system, which is more sophisticated than the Russian-produced system currently in use by Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Amos Yadlin, Zvi Magen, and Vera Michlin-Shapir consider the logic behind the Kremlin’s stance and its implications for Israel:

Russia is trying [to use this incident] to demonstrate its primacy in Syria and to position itself more advantageously in anticipation of a bargain with the U.S. and other Western countries over the future political order in Syria. In such a case, Israel might find itself a party to a larger international game, where it would need the backing of the U.S. In this context, the recent denunciation by unnamed senior U.S. officials of the transfer of antiaircraft missiles to Syria is welcome. Yet it is also important that Washington back its words with action in helping to prevent Iran’s entrenchment in Syria at this critical point, where Israel’s freedom of action is now threatened. . . .

Nevertheless, it seems that the current crisis does not change the strategic balance. . . . It is unlikely that Russia is interested in damaging [its] relations with Israel, which are valuable to Moscow as well as to Jerusalem. Ideally the parties will find a solution soon, more or less based on the familiar arrangements in the Syrian arena, with minimal restrictions on Israel’s freedom of movement and mechanisms to avoid friction.

[Even] the transfer of S-300 systems, should it take place, is also unlikely to change Israel’s motivations and actions. There would be nothing new, [since] Russia already has [the even] more advanced S-400 system in place. In addition, Israel has prepared for over a decade for Syria’s operation of the S-300 and has weapon systems developed precisely to face it; it also possesses F-35 fighter jets, which were designed to strike exactly such systems. If Israel does evade or destroy these weapons, it might damage the reputation of a Russian air-defense system.

The September 17 incident was perhaps inevitable sooner or later because of intensive Israel Air Force activity against the Iranian presence in Syria and the transfer of advanced weapons to Hizballah. The reasons why Israel adopted this strategy are still valid, and it is of paramount importance that Israel continue the campaign to stop Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, while preserving a friendly relationship with Russia.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.