Don’t Let Iran Benefit from Jamal Khashoggi’s Disappearance

Last week, Jamal Khashoggi—a Saudi national who regularly writes for the Washington Post—disappeared in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Speculation that he was murdered or kidnapped has provoked a bipartisan group of senators to call for sanctions on Saudis involved in the apparent abduction, and a few have even called for the suspension of military aid to Riyadh. Matthew Continetti cautions against acting rashly:

It would not benefit anyone, least of all the United States, if Iran ends up gaining most from the Khashoggi affair. Because Iran, while not mentioned in relation to Khashoggi, is nonetheless a factor in this story. . . .

Saudi Arabia has been the linchpin of America’s Middle East strategy for close to a century. That relationship has not been without costs. What would the cost be if the alliance fractured? The Saudis would be imperiled in Yemen, potentially endangering the free flow of traffic in the Gulf of Aden. An Iranian victory there would extend a Shiite crescent in the south to accompany the one running through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Governments without democratic legitimacy are brittle and unpredictable—a fact highlighted not only by Khashoggi but also by recent Saudi actions against Canada and the crown prince’s delayed public offering of the oil giant Aramco. America has sustained and protected the Saudis for decades. Withdrawing such protection would open the regime to both domestic and international challenges. As President Trump put it recently, Saudi Arabia wouldn’t last two weeks without American support. The Middle East and Levant already are filled with examples of state failure. Is America prepared to risk another?

A Saudi meltdown would deprive the United States of a counterterrorist ally, roil energy markets, create pockets of instability in which jihadists and Iranian-backed militias thrive, and cause headaches for Israel. To forestall such a disaster, the Saudis, like others before them, might turn to either Russia or China for support. That would accelerate the waning of American influence in the Middle East. It would boost the very autocracies we condemn.

Punish the Saudis if it turns out they acted no better than Russia, China, North Korea, Syria, and Iran. And as you weigh the evidence and consider the form of reprimand, keep in mind the following: the penalty must fit the crime; neither democracy nor peace is likely to follow the end of the House of Saud; and the morality of cable news and the op-ed page counts for little in the ruthless, brutal, conspiratorial, and bloody Middle East.

Read more at Washington Free Beacon

More about: Iran, Politics & Current Affairs, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, U.S. Foreign policy

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security