How an Organization Tied to a Palestinian Terrorist Group Put a Bill Before Congress

Oct. 11 2018

Currently the Palestinian branch of Defense for Children International—an organization founded in 1979 to combat the human trafficking of minors—is running a “no way to treat a child” campaign to combat fictitious mistreatment of Palestinian children by the IDF. The group, which goes by the acronym DCI-P, has exploited its connection with its parent organization to receive funding and other support from EU institutions and such Western philanthropies as the American Friends Service Committee. But, as Emily Benedek details, DCI-P has such extensive links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—the group responsible for the Lod Airport massacre, the hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe, and many other acts of terror—that it could reasonably described as the PFLP’s propaganda arm:

The Palestinian branch of DCI, DCI-P, founded in 1991, asserts that although it has pledged to “follow DCI’s mandate to ‘promote and protect children’s rights in accordance with international standards,’” it reserves the right to go its own way, by “autonomously” developing its own programs. . . .

The relationship [between DCI-P and the PFLP was likely] unknown [to] Congresswoman Betty McCollum of Minnesota, who sponsored a bill about Palestinian children that was largely written by DCIP. McCollum introduced this bill in November 2017—HR-4391, “The Promoting of Human Rights by Ending Israeli Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act”—which would prohibit “U.S. assistance to Israel from being used to support the military detention, interrogation, or ill-treatment of Palestinian children in violation of international humanitarian law.”

What the PFLP has not achieved through terror alone, it may now be attempting to achieve through the manipulation of international aid organizations and the language of humanitarian concern for the welfare of children.

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More about: Congress, EU, Israel & Zionism, NGO, Palestinian terror, PFLP

Israel Should Try to Defang Hamas without Toppling It

Feb. 22 2019

For the time being, Hamas has chosen to avoid outright war with the Jewish state, but instead to apply sustained, low-intensity pressure through its weekly border riots and organizing terrorist cells in the West Bank. Yet it is simultaneously engaged in a major military build-up, which suggests that it has not entirely been deterred by the previous three Gaza wars. Yaakov Lappin considers Jerusalem’s options:

In recent years, the Israel Defense Force’s southern command, which is responsible for much of the war planning for Gaza, identified a long-term truce as the best of bad options for Israel. This is based on the understanding that an Israeli invasion of Gaza and subsequent destruction of the Hamas regime would leave Israel in the unenviable position of being directly in charge of some two-million mostly hostile Gazans. This could lead to an open-ended and draining military occupation. . . .

Alternatively, Israel could demolish the Hamas regime and leave Gaza, putting it on a fast track to a “Somalia model” of anarchy and violence. In that scenario, . . . multiple jihadist armed gangs lacking a central ruling structure would appear, and Israel would be unable to project its military might to any single “return address” in Gaza. This would result in a loss of Israel’s deterrent force on Gaza to keep the region calm. This scenario would be considerably worse than the current status quo.

But a third option, in between the options of leaving Gaza as it is and toppling Hamas in a future war, may exist. In this scenario, the IDF would decimate Hamas’s military wing in any future conflict but leave its political wing and police force in place. This would enable a rapid Israeli exit after a war, but avoid a Somalia-like fate for Gaza with its destructive implications for both Israelis and Gazans. . . .

On the one hand, Hamas’s police force is an intrinsic support system for Gaza’s terrorist-guerrilla forces. On the other hand, the police and domestic-security units play a genuine role in keeping order. Such forces have been used to repress Islamic State-affiliated cells that challenge Hamas’s rule. . . . Compared to the alternative scenarios of indefinite occupation or the “Somalia scenario,” a weakened Hamas might be the best and most realistic option.

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More about: Gaza Strip, Hamas, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security