When Jewish Americans decided to exchange their overtly Jewish-sounding surnames for more Anglo-Saxon ones, it was not because they were just-arrived immigrants who realized their names were difficult for native English speakers to pronounce. Rather, name-changing petitions presented to American courts in the period around World War I were usually filed by those who were already entering the middle class and believed their old names would make it difficult for them, or for their children, to find employment. Kirsten Fermaglich writes:

By the 1930s, the vast majority of name changers [in New York City]—between 75 and 85 percent—wanted to abandon “foreign” names that were “difficult to pronounce and spell” and to adopt instead more “American” names. These individuals were hoping to shed the ethnic markers that disadvantaged them in American society by taking on unmarked, ordinary names that would go unnoticed.

Although New Yorkers of many different ethnic backgrounds—including those with Italian-, Slavic-, Armenian-, Greek-, and German-sounding names—petitioned to replace their ethnic names between 1917 and 1942, Jewish-sounding names predominated in the City Court files, far out of proportion to Jews’ actual numbers in the city. In 1932, for example, roughly 65 percent of the total pool of petitioners had Jewish-sounding names. By way of comparison, during that same year, the number of petitioners with Italian-sounding surnames (the next-largest ethnic group in the petitions during these years) represented roughly 11 percent of the petitioners.

The large number of Jewish name-change petitioners cannot be explained by the large presence of Jews in New York City. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Jewish population in New York City was roughly 26 to 29 percent. The Italian population at the same time was roughly 14 to 16 percent. Given those numbers, one might expect Jews to change their names at roughly double the rate of Italians, . . . not six times the rate of Italians, as was actually reflected in the petitions.

While Jewish middle-class strength was reflected in name-change petitions, however, the fact that roughly 65 percent of name-change petitioners had Jewish-sounding names in the 1930s also reflects the rise of institutionalized anti-Semitism during the interwar years. . . . Although anti-Semitism had existed in the United States before this era, it had not been a significant feature of American institutional, social, or political life. . . . In an era of exploding racial categories and fears at the turn of the century, however, Jewish difference became a far more important factor in American society.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.