In Modern Orthodox Judaism: A Documentary History, Zev Eleff for the first time has collected the source materials necessary to understand the development of a denomination that, although its adherents account for under 10 percent of affiliated American Jewry, now plays a disproportionate role in American Jewish life. Daniel Ross Goodman praises the book, while noting some serious gaps:

The history of self-consciously “modern” Orthodoxy is inseparable from the history of Yeshiva University, which is a product of the early 20th century. Eleff covers Yeshiva University’s birth, development, and evolution. . . . Of course, the book also contains several key statements from Modern Orthodoxy’s most outstanding spokesmen: the great halakhist and thinker Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, [the movement’s most prominent rabbi until his death in 1993], and Rabbi Norman Lamm, who served as the president of Yeshiva University from 1976 to 2003. . . .

Although Rabbi Lamm has been a central figure of inestimable importance to Modern Orthodoxy for nearly seven decades, graduates of Yeshiva University, and anyone even tangentially connected to the institution, are well aware of the fact that it has not been Lamm but rather Yeshiva University’s rashey yeshivah—authoritative halakhists and brilliant talmudists like Hershel Schachter, Mordechai Willig, [and others]—who have, arguably, had a more direct impact on the lives of thousands upon thousands of American Modern Orthodox Jews. It is surprising then, that a volume that features so many texts related to Yeshiva University all but completely excludes figures who can be said to have been the university’s most influential rabbis.

When it comes to Modern Orthodoxy’s present challenges, Goodman finds Eleff better attuned:

The ideology of Modern Orthodoxy, undergirded by Soloveitchik’s distinctive blend of existentialism and neo-Kantianism, is a difficult one to grasp. Most people prefer clear lines and black-and-white differentiations to living with complexity, and it doesn’t help matters that even many of those rabbinic leaders who understand Soloveitchik’s philosophy and embody its values, like Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, do not identify themselves as Modern Orthodox.

This, combined with growing pressure from its right and left flanks, the prohibitive cost of Modern Orthodox life, widespread theological uncertainty, and a continuous “brain drain” in which many of the most committed American Modern Orthodox Jews leave for Israel—Modern Orthodox Jews have the highest rates of aliyah among all American Jews—means that the movement’s future will likely be as ambiguous and complicated as its complex, tension-filled philosophy.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.