Why the U.S. Should Not Have Made Allowances for Iran’s Civilian Nuclear Program

Last week, the White House re-imposed hundreds of sanctions on the Islamic Republic in addition to creating new ones. But it also made a number of exceptions. Perhaps the most puzzling of these were the waivers allowing cooperation with Iran’s civilian nuclear projects—all of which have been tied to its clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons. Jacob Nagel and Jonathan Schanzer write:

The Europeans, in their tenacious bid to save what is left of the nuclear deal, argue that providing Iran overt access to nuclear technology under Western supervision is better than Iran secretly making advances without oversight. This is a line also repeated by think tanks in Washington. But . . . Iran would almost certainly pursue both. And if the goal is to prevent Iran from accruing nuclear knowledge, for fear that it may make a dash for the bomb at a later date, providing assistance seems unwise, to put it mildly.

For now, it appears the Trump administration has adopted the European view—perhaps as a concession for effectively inducing the Europeans to rejoin the American sanctions regime. But instead of cementing this policy, Washington should take the opportunity to impose a more restrictive one. This should include more rigorous oversight and real accountability for countries selling dual-use goods. . . .

To stymie Iran’s continued quest for nuclear weapons, the red lines must be clear, [including with regard to] Iran’s quest for nuclear expertise. Washington should return to its previous policy of preventing civilian advances [in nuclear technology]. This should include preventing universities and research institutions, both in the United States and around the world, from teaching, training, or employing Iranian students and researchers in the fields of nuclear physics or related fields. The United States should further request that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) terminate investments and technical assistance for Iranian nuclear projects and end IAEA-hosted seminars and conferences in Iran as well. Indeed, until Iranian behavior changes, the goal should be to prevent Iran from [cultivating] a new generation of nuclear scientists and missile engineers.

Read more at National Interest

More about: Europe, Iran, Iran nuclear program, Iran sanctions, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF