Did Maimonides Reform Jewish Law to Keep Jews Out of Islamic Courts?

Dec. 28 2018

In Maimonides and the Merchants, Mark R. Cohen explores how the legal rulings of the great 12th-century philosopher and jurist—along with those of other rabbis living in the medieval Islamic world—were shaped by the lived social and economic realities of their day. Documents found in the Cairo Genizah, for instance, show that it was common at the time for both Jewish and Muslim merchants to enter into arrangements whereby one merchant served as an agent for the other in one country, while the second did the same for the first in a different country. Cohen argues that Maimonides shaped his rulings to account for such arrangements, as Ezra Blaustein writes in his review:

In [the section of his code titled] “Laws of Agents and Partners,” [Maimonides] discusses the case of a person conducting business through the use of an agent and allows that person to demand that the agent swear an oath affirming that he did not steal any merchandise or embezzle any money while it was in his hands. Maimonides portrays this ruling as growing organically from an established rabbinic law about partners, who may demand oaths from each other, but, in fact, previous halakhah had treated agents and partners as entirely separate categories. Cohen persuasively argues that Maimonides yoked them together precisely because business arrangements [involving mutual agency] were so common in his world. . . .

These partnerships of agency, critical to commercial operations in this period, would have been difficult to fit into existing halakhah. The Talmud simply does not hold an agent to the same standards of accountability as it does a partner. Previous Jewish law would have regarded [the participants in the sort of arrangement to which Maimonides refers] as mere agents of each other, without the kind of legal protections and recourse necessary to make such an arrangement work, [and] without the ability to supply legal remedies when it didn’t. As a result, Jews would often turn to local Muslim judges to resolve disputes. . . . In transferring the oath of partners to a case of agency, Maimonides provided Jewish courts with a means of enforcement for this arrangement.

This resolution represents a model for Cohen’s broader historical argument. The Talmud assumed an economy centered around agriculture or local trade. As such, Cohen explains, it could not respond to all the demands of the more dynamic, long-distance mercantile system of the Islamic world in which Maimonides lived. This situation forced Jewish traders into Islamic courts, which were equipped to deal with such partnerships, a development that horrified Maimonides, who rails against visiting non-Jewish courts in [his code of Jewish law] in language even more forceful than that used in the Talmud forbidding this practice.

Maimonides, Cohen hypothesizes, hoped “to bring the Jewish merchant back into the halls of Jewish justice rather than have him cross the line to plead his case in the Islamic courtroom,” by yoking the halakhic concepts of partnership and agency to reflect the economic world in which he lived.

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More about: Halakhah, History & Ideas, Middle Ages, Moses Maimonides, Religion & Holidays, Sharia

 

The Syrian Civil War May Be Coming to an End, but Three New Wars Are Rising There

March 26 2019

With both Islamic State and the major insurgent forces largely defeated, Syria now stands divided into three parts. Some 60 percent of the country, in the west and south, is in the hands of Bashar al-Assad and his allies. Another 30 percent, in the northeast, is in the hands of the mostly Kurdish, and American-backed, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The final 10 percent, in the northwest, is held by Sunni jihadists, some affiliated with al-Qaeda, under Turkish protection. But, writes Jonathan Spyer, the situation is far from stable. Kurds, likely linked to the SDF, have been waging an insurgency in the Turkish areas, and that’s only one of the problems:

The U.S.- and SDF-controlled area east of the Euphrates is also witnessing the stirrings of internal insurgency directed from outside. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “236 [SDF] fighters, civilians, oil workers, and officials” have been killed since August 2018 in incidents unrelated to the frontline conflict against Islamic State. . . . The SDF blames Turkey for these actions, and for earlier killings such as that of a prominent local Kurdish official. . . . There are other plausible suspects within Syria, however, including the Assad regime (or its Iranian allies) or Islamic State, all of which are enemies of the U.S.-supported Kurds.

The area controlled by the regime is by far the most secure of Syria’s three separate regions. [But, for instance, in] the restive Daraa province in the southwest, [there has been] a renewed small-scale insurgency against the Assad regime. . . .

As Islamic State’s caliphate disappears from Syria’s map, the country is settling into a twilight reality of de-facto division, in which a variety of low-burning insurgencies continue to claim lives. Open warfare in Syria is largely over. Peace, however, will remain a distant hope.

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More about: ISIS, Kurds, Politics & Current Affairs, Syrian civil war, Turkey