For some time, Washington’s policy toward Lebanon has rested on the fiction that the country’s government and military are separate from Hizballah and are therefore deserving of American support. Giora Eiland argues that by threatening to cut off that support, the U.S can undermine Hizballah and, in turn, increase pressure on its patrons in Tehran:

Lebanon’s elected president, prime minister, and parliament have control only over the civil activities in the country, whereas military power lies only in the hands of Hizballah. Therefore, it is about time for the U.S. to present Beirut with an ultimatum: if it wants to continue being seen as an independent country, it must demand that Hizballah demilitarize and renounce its heavy weapons.

If Lebanon refuses, the U.S. would boycott it along with any organization that would agree to do business with it. . . . There are [several] reasons why Lebanon may renounce Hizballah. [One] is that a silent majority of Lebanese oppose Hizballah and are justifiably concerned about the destruction that would be inflicted on them and their country if the Shiite terror organization drags them into a military campaign against Israel.

[Another] is that [Hizballah] is facing a severe financial crisis. It must treat thousands wounded in the Syrian civil war, pay the families of Lebanese fighters who lost their lives in that war, and pay the pensions of militants who joined the organization 30 years ago and are now retiring. [Moreover], unlike in Syria, Russia does not have strong interests in Lebanon, and it certainly does not have any interest in empowering Iran there.

Hizballah, Eiland concludes, might be forced to back down in the face of U.S. sanctions on Lebanon; if it did, Israel would be significantly less threatened, a third Lebanon war would be less likely, and Iran’s regional position would be compromised.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.