Today marks the third anniversary since implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as the agreement to curb the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions is officially known. Since then, the U.S. has formally left the deal, but the other parties remain committed to it, and Tehran insists that it is still complying with it. But, argue Emily Landau and Ephraim Asculai, insufficient effort is being made to ensure that it actually is doing so:

[T]wo major problems related to the JCPOA that arose over the course of 2018 demand immediate and serious attention. The first relates to inspections at undeclared nuclear-related facilities in Iran. The nuclear archives that were removed by Israel’s Mossad from the heart of Tehran in January 2018 include vast amounts of information regarding Iran’s nuclear program and specific plans for developing five nuclear bombs. Included is information regarding specific locations where Iran has been advancing its military nuclear program, and evidence that Iran lied to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the years about the purpose of different activities.

Yet, although it received this information, the IAEA has yet to inspect any of these facilities or confront Iran with the evidence of deceit. With a few notable exceptions, . . . the issue is also curiously absent from the principal debate within the arms-control community in the U.S. Moreover, although it is the largest financial contributor to the IAEA, the U.S. has not as yet exerted its influence to bring about the necessary changes to IAEA activities and to improve its reporting culture since implementation of the JCPOA.

The second issue is Iran’s missile program, in particular the recent Iranian test of a medium-range missile that can reach the entire Middle East and parts of Europe, and can carry a nuclear warhead. While this test is a major concern, the European states and the arms-control community prefer to emphasize that Iran’s test is not a clear violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231, which only “calls upon” Iran to cease such activities. The two states in Europe that did demonstrate more concern—France and the UK—were afraid to take concrete action for fear of upsetting the JCPOA. . . .

If the present trends of ignoring Iran’s past activities in the nuclear realm persist, including the IAEA’s current unwillingness or inability to ascertain past and present nuclear activities, there will be severe repercussions. Empowered by ongoing efforts in the missile realm and diplomatic maneuvering to ensure that President Trump is regarded as the outsider in his approach to Iran, Iran might yet prove successful in surviving the [U.S] pressure campaign. At that point it could be too late for any diplomatic or military actions to stop Iran from ultimately developing nuclear weapons.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.