In addition to placing permanent military infrastructure in Syria—in the form both of its own Revolutionary Guard and of Hizballah and other Shiite militias—Tehran also seeks to establish its permanent influence by purchasing land, engineering demographic change, and taking control of religious institutions. Hanin Ghaddar and Dana Stroul argue that Washington can counteract these efforts without troops:

Over the past year, Sunni communities have been pushed out of their long-time homes [in the vicinity of Damascus] and replaced by people friendly to Iran and the Assad regime. . . . According to reports quoting Syrian officials, more than 8,000 properties in the Damascus area have been transferred to foreign Shiite owners in the past three years. Iran is also transforming local Sunni mosques into Shiite religious centers and shrines, as well as constructing new Shiite meeting halls, mosques, and schools. . . .

Another development that indicates Iran’s goal of establishing a multi-generational presence in Syria is the Assad regime’s decision to open Farsi-language departments in several educational institutions, including Damascus University, Baath University in Homs, and Tishreen University in Latakia. The courses offered by these departments come with a wide array of incentives to boost the number of Syrians they reach. . .

In August 2017, Washington froze more than $200 million in U.S. stabilization assistance for communities liberated from Islamic State. Although Saudi Arabia and other countries have pledged to fill the funding gap, restarting U.S. assistance would give Syrian communities an immediate alternative to Iranian patronage, particularly with regard to civilian protection, job creation, education, and basic services. Even without U.S. forces on hand, the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development have developed robust programs for providing and monitoring aid in hard-to-reach places. These programs should be expanded to more meaningful levels. . . .

Recently, several regional governments have reached out to Syria, [having concluded] that the Assad regime is here to stay given Russia and Iran’s unconditional support. . . . Yet such rapprochement should not be given away for free. The [Trump] administration should press these governments to insist on specific conditions before reopening their embassies, such as the reversal of Law Number 10, [which has dispossessed Sunnis and enabled Iranian demographic engineering], and the closing of Iran-sponsored religious institutions.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.