Why John Bolton Is Right to Threaten Military Action against Iran

Earlier this week, reports circulated that National Security Adviser John Bolton had asked to see the Pentagon’s plans for striking the Islamic Republic after one of its Iraqi proxy forces fired mortars in the direction of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Ray Takeyh argues that, contrary to the horrified response of the media, force—and even the credible threat of force—has a track record of success in dealings with the ayatollahs, unlike the approach taken by some American presidents:

No president was more concerned with the Islamic revolutionaries’ sensibilities than Jimmy Carter. Even after Iranian militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took American diplomats hostage, Carter hoped to resolve the crisis in a manner that did not jeopardize the possibility of resuming ties with the theocracy. Such deference helped prolong the crisis for 444 days and essentially doomed Carter’s presidency. . . .

[By contrast, in] the summer of 1988, there was an ongoing conflict between American naval ships and Iranian speedboats laying down mines in the Gulf waters. As the confrontation on the high seas was taking place, an Iranian passenger plane was making its way to Dubai. As the aircraft approached, the USS Vincennes mistook it for a hostile vessel and shot it down, killing 290 passengers.

Despite days of mourning and incendiary speeches, Iran’s reaction was basically subdued, as Tehran appreciated that the asymmetry of power militated against escalation of the conflict. The one dramatic consequence of the downing of the passenger plane was that it finally convinced the clerical elite that it was time to abandon the war with Iraq, [which had been going on for eight years, since] they mistakenly believed [it] was a prelude to America’s entering the war on Saddam Hussein’s behalf with the purpose of overthrowing the Islamic Republic. Even Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was indifferent to loss of human life, proved too respectful of American power to persist with a war that he felt might now include the United States. . . .

Donald Trump and Bolton are the latest American policymakers to unsettle the Islamic Republic. The signs coming out of the White House may at times be ambiguous, but the tough talk and the tough actions have had an impact in Tehran. The U.S. has withdrawn from the flawed Iran nuclear deal and re-imposed sanctions on Iran that have knocked off nearly a million barrels from its oil exports and crippled its economy. And yet the U.S. has faced no retaliatory Iranian response. . . . Why? Because it respects and fears the power of the United States when wielded appropriately.

Read more at Politico

More about: Iran, Iran-Iraq war, Jimmy Carter, John Bolton, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF