In the Israeli system, seats in the Knesset are divided proportionally among those parties that received a minimum of 3.25 percent of the national vote. Votes for any party that does not meet the 3.25-percent threshold are thus “wasted” since they don’t translate into potential members of a governing coalition. Thus, in order to ensure that both parties would pass the threshold, the religious Zionist Jewish Home party, at Prime Minister Netanyahu’s urging, merged with the Kahanist party Otzma, creating much handwringing about a supposed rising tide of chauvinism in Israel. Evelyn Gordon argues that, whatever Otzma’s defects, the real problem isn’t a change in attitudes but a 2014 decision to raise the electoral threshold from 2 percent:

With a lower threshold, Netanyahu would have no interest in promoting a merger between Jewish Home and Otzma: by definition, any party that couldn’t get elected on its own would win so few votes that [a potential governing coalition] could probably spare it. Today, however, Jewish Home could easily fail to pass the threshold while still wasting enough votes to cost the right its majority. So for anyone who considers a continuation of right-wing policy essential, as Netanyahu and Jewish Home both do, shoring up the latter through a joint ticket suddenly looks essential as well. . . .

In the seventeen years preceding Netanyahu’s 2009 victory, Israelis thrice elected former generals who campaigned against diplomatic concessions [to the Palestinians], which they promptly turned around and implemented once in office. . . . But Netanyahu has proved for ten years now that he [won’t do such a thing]. Thus anyone fearful of further territorial concessions has good reason to stick with him rather than gambling on [his leading rival, the former general Benny] Gantz. And given what previous withdrawals have cost, such fear is unquestionably justified. Yitzḥak Rabin’s Oslo Accords and Ehud Barak’s failed summit [with Yasir Arafat] both sparked upsurges of terror that together killed some 1,500 Israelis. Ariel Sharon’s disengagement [from Gaza] led to 20,000 rockets being launched on Israel’s south. . . .

[Furthermore], a lower threshold would facilitate the entry of new parties that Israel actually needs, like a moderate Arab party and a moderate ḥaredi one. Demand exists for such parties in both communities. But a higher threshold discourages voters from taking a flyer on a new party, since it means the party will have less chance of getting in and will waste more votes if it fails. Yet, as the last two elections have counterintuitively proven, a lower threshold also reduces the likelihood of extremists entering the Knesset by eliminating a powerful incentive to merge with them.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.