During the holy month of Ramadan, which concludes this weekend, it has become de rigueur in Arab countries to air special miniseries, which families watch every evening as they gather to break the daily fast. Edy Cohen comments on three shows this year that portray Jews and the Jewish state, including the anti-Semitic Egyptian science-fiction series The End.

Arab governments have long understood the potential of television and other visual media as a means of transmitting political messages. They actively promote shows that conform to their agendas, such as fostering negative images of political rivals both abroad and at home. Many dramas produced in recent years, especially in Turkey and Egypt, have featured Jewish, Israeli, and Zionist elements for the purpose of demonizing them.

In contrast to the Egyptian-produced show, the other two series, which were produced either directly by Saudi Arabia or with its approval, indicate a positive trend regarding attitudes toward Israel in the Gulf States. Um Haroun (Mother of Aaron), which depicts the lives of Jews in the Gulf region, was seen by many as an effort to promote normalization of relations with Israel.

The third show, Exit 7, is similarly of Saudi origin and is also considered an effort to promote closer ties with Israel. It features the most famous actors in the kingdom. While it deals primarily with social issues, the first episode contains heavy criticism of the Palestinians. One scene shows the main character saying he does business with Israel because Israel is not really an enemy. Hinting at the Palestinians, he says the real enemy is someone who doesn’t appreciate you. This scene is a depiction of the palpable existing tension between Saudis and the Palestinians.

The Palestinians, who oppose normalization with Israel by any segment of the Arab world and consider it deeply threatening to their cause, were enraged to see such scenes aired on Saudi television.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.