In 1977, Chabad-Lubavitch Hasidim opened the Crown Heights Art Institute (CHAI) in the eponymous Brooklyn neighborhood to showcase the work of hasidic artists. Dovid Margolin tells the story of that unprecedented institution and its founder and director, Zev Markowitz:

Markowitz was born in 1947 to Holocaust survivors in the western Ukrainian town of Mukachevo, better known in the Jewish world by its Yiddish name, Munkatch. . . . Markowitz’s father was a serious art collector back in the USSR, and Zev had studied art in Leningrad, Russia’s cultural capital. In late 1977, not long after Markowitz’s introduction to Crown Heights, Rabbi Elya Gross, the then-director of the Crown Heights Jewish Community Council, decided to establish a permanent art gallery to assist and showcase local hasidic artists. When Gross got wind of Markowitz’s art background, he offered him the directorship of the new institution.

CHAI came about as the direct result of [an exhibit] held in the fall of 1977 at the Brooklyn Museum. Titled “Hasidic Artists in Brooklyn,” it marked the first time observant hasidic artists had ever received such attention in a major museum. . . . “Are these relatively drab-looking, strict people allowed to indulge in such colorful work?” the Village Voice asked in its 1977 review of the exhibition. “Of course we are,” responded Raphael Eisenberg, who . . . was among the show’s participating artists.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.