On Friday, the artist and physician Mark Podwal died at the age seventy-nine. As Menachem Wecker notes, Podwal’s “drawings and paintings often drew on Jewish history, including ritual practice and centuries of anti-Semitism.” Wecker considers the career of this Jewish artist:

Podwal developed a strong connection with the Altneuschul—the synagogue in Prague that dates back to the 13th century—where he designed the ark and bimah covers for High Holy Days and was proud to have his own seat. He spent many holidays there and often exhibited his work in Prague, as well as throughout the United States and Israel.

Podwal’s works, which appear in tens of books, including his 2016 volume Reimagined: 45 Years of Jewish Art, for which Elie Wiesel wrote the introduction and the renowned Jewish writer Cynthia Ozick wrote the preface, drew often on Jewish history and rabbinic writings. His works and his writings about his art . . . often cited from the Midrash, [Talmud], historians, poets, Jewish mysticism, and a variety of other literary and religious sources.

This newsletter last featured work by Podwal in July.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.