Wednesday’s newsletter cited Joseph Epstein’s view of that vexing and perennial question of what makes a work of literature Jewish, and his conclusion that Marcel Proust’s fiction meets the standard. But while no one can ask Proust what he thinks, it’s not necessary to ask the Romanian Jewish writer Norman Manea—whose most recent novel was recently published in English translation—since he has already expressed his opinion. Benjamin Balint writes:

Manea’s characters, like Dante’s shades in the Inferno, live a purgatorial existence—trapped between the twin tyrannies of Nazism and Communism. Their identities are fractured and reconstituted through memory, or more often, the impossibility of memory. . . .

Several of Manea’s friends had fled to Israel [by the time he came to the West in the 1980s], including the historian Leon Volovici (author of a searing account of Romanian anti-Semitism in the 1930s). “If you want to be a Jew, go to Israel,” Volovici advised his friend. “If you want to be a writer, don’t go to Israel.” Manea, ambivalent about his Jewishness, wanted to remain a writer. While still in Romania, he had expressed annoyance when Hebrew translations of his stories appeared in an Israeli anthology called Jewish Writers in Romanian. “I considered myself, quite simply, a Romanian writer.”

Only decades later, wondering whether the title of that anthology was “the correct assessment of my destiny,” did he come to a belated recognition: “I am a Jew. I may negate it. I may dislike it. But that’s it—because despite all my efforts to try to be different, to be, as I said, more universal, I am still also something quite specific.” For Manea, it turned out, Jewishness has been the hinge, if not the whole door.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.