Last year, archaeologists discovered lumps of clay (known as bullae) made for sealing documents in Khirbet Summeily in the Negev. Their presence suggests a higher degree of political organization in 10th-century BCE Israel than was previously thought, thus lending greater credibility to the biblical books of Samuel and I Kings. James Hardin, Christopher Rollston, and Jeffrey Blakely explain what this discovery implies (free registration required):

A seal of the parties to an agreement would be impressed into the soft clay leaving an impression. A document “sealed” in this fashion would not be opened (that is, the seal would not be broken) unless there was some legal reason to do so, for example, in some sort of a court case where the contents of the document were at issue. . . . The precise material that the Summeily bullae “sealed” is still in the process of analysis. . . . But the practice of sealing is an elite or official activity.

We believe that the remains discovered at Summeily demonstrate a level of politico-economic activity that has not been suspected for the late Iron Age I [1300-1000 BCE] and early Iron Age IIA [1000-800 BCE]. . . . Many scholars have tended to dismiss trends toward political complexity (that is, state formation) occurring prior to the arrival of the Assyrians in the region in the later 8th century BCE. However, based on our work in the Hesi region, we believe these processes began much earlier.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.