Toward the end of World War I, Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization and later the first president of Israel, established cordial relations with Emir Faisal, the son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca and later the first king of Iraq. Shortly thereafter, the two would sign an agreement establishing an alliance between an unborn Jewish state and an unborn Arab one, as recounted by the Israel State Archives:

On June 17, 1918, Weizmann wrote to his wife Vera in London about the romantic journey along the Red Sea past the “glowing mountains” of Sinai via Aqaba to the Anglo-Arab army in southeast Transjordan. Here he met Faisal: “the first real Arab nationalist I have met. He is a leader! He is quite intelligent and a very honest man, handsome as a picture. He is not interested in Palestine, but on the other hand he wants Damascus and the whole of northern Syria.”

Weizmann noted that [Faisal] he was contemptuous of the Palestinians and did not regard them as Arabs. He saw Faisal as an alternative to the Palestinian leadership, which was hostile to the Zionists’ aspirations. . . . Weizmann did not realize the depth of Arab nationalism, which was in its early stages but would quickly gain ground.

In December 1918, Faisal and Weizmann met again in London. In the interim, Faisal had captured Damascus, which he hoped would be the capital of the Arab kingdom promised by the British, but his regime there was fragile. In their talk on December 11, Weizmann promised help from the Zionist movement. . . . An agreement was drawn up, signed on January 3, 1919, in which Faisal expressed approval of the Balfour Declaration and Jewish settlement in Palestine. Other clauses ensured freedom of religion and Muslim control of the holy places sacred to Islam.

That accord was short-lived. Giving in to the demands of Arab nationalists, Faisal petitioned the Western powers for an Arab state that included Palestine. In short order, the British allowed France to take over Syria (against the wishes of both Faisal and Weizmann), Faisal became king of Iraq, and nothing came of his earlier alliance with the Zionists.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.