Albert Einstein spent much of the latter part of his career as a self-proclaimed public intellectual, advocating pacifism and (a qualified) Zionism and denouncing nuclear weapons and the cold war. Gertrude Himmelfarb, reviewing a new biography, examines his political evolution:

What [Einstein] discovered in Germany [in the 1930s] was a denigration of Jews, even among scientists and intellectuals, that gave him a heightened appreciation of his Jewishness—not as a religion, to be sure, but as a culture; even, he ventured to say, a nation: “Not until we dare to see ourselves as a nation, not until we respect ourselves, can we gain the respect of others.” But it was a special kind of nation he had in mind, defined by morality rather than polity. . . .

This was not quite the nationhood most Zionists had in mind. Einstein shared their idea of Palestine as a refuge for persecuted Jews—not, however, as a homeland reserved for them but as a safe area where they could live in peace with their neighbors. He also valued it as a center of Jewish learning and culture, to exemplify the “intellectual striving” that he saw as the essence of Judaism. . . .

[By the 1930s,] Einstein had come a long way from the physicist to the social activist. It is as if, displaced by quantum mechanics from the center of physics, he found a new calling in politics. But perhaps not entirely a new calling, for he was now seeking a rationality in society akin to the reason he had so passionately sought in physics. . . .

In retrospect, Himmelfarb concludes, “some of Einstein’s views, on war and peace, capitalism and socialism, Judaism and Zionism, may appear as almost a parody of the right-minded (which is to say, left-thinking) progressive of his time.”

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.