Albert Einstein spent much of the latter part of his career as a self-proclaimed public intellectual, advocating pacifism and (a qualified) Zionism and denouncing nuclear weapons and the cold war. Gertrude Himmelfarb, reviewing a new biography, examines his political evolution:

What [Einstein] discovered in Germany [in the 1930s] was a denigration of Jews, even among scientists and intellectuals, that gave him a heightened appreciation of his Jewishness—not as a religion, to be sure, but as a culture; even, he ventured to say, a nation: “Not until we dare to see ourselves as a nation, not until we respect ourselves, can we gain the respect of others.” But it was a special kind of nation he had in mind, defined by morality rather than polity. . . .

This was not quite the nationhood most Zionists had in mind. Einstein shared their idea of Palestine as a refuge for persecuted Jews—not, however, as a homeland reserved for them but as a safe area where they could live in peace with their neighbors. He also valued it as a center of Jewish learning and culture, to exemplify the “intellectual striving” that he saw as the essence of Judaism. . . .

[By the 1930s,] Einstein had come a long way from the physicist to the social activist. It is as if, displaced by quantum mechanics from the center of physics, he found a new calling in politics. But perhaps not entirely a new calling, for he was now seeking a rationality in society akin to the reason he had so passionately sought in physics. . . .

In retrospect, Himmelfarb concludes, “some of Einstein’s views, on war and peace, capitalism and socialism, Judaism and Zionism, may appear as almost a parody of the right-minded (which is to say, left-thinking) progressive of his time.”

In a sense, the most successful negotiation with Hamas was the recent agreement securing the release of Edan Alexander, the last living hostage with a U.S. passport. Unlike those previously handed over, he wasn’t exchanged for Palestinian prisoners, and there was no cease-fire. Dan Diker explains what Hamas got out of the deal:

Alexander’s unconditional release [was] designed to legitimize Hamas further as a viable negotiator and to keep Hamas in power, particularly at a moment when Israel is expanding its military campaign to conquer Gaza and eliminate Hamas as a military, political, and civil power. Israel has no other option than defeating Hamas. Hamas’s “humanitarian” move encourages American pressure on Israel to end its counterterrorism war in service of advancing additional U.S. efforts to release hostages over time, legitimizing Hamas while it rearms, resupplies, and reestablishes it military power and control.

In fact, Hamas-affiliated media have claimed credit for successful negotiations with the U.S., branding the release of Edan Alexander as the “Edan deal,” portraying Hamas as a rising international player, sidelining Israel from direct talks with DC, and declaring this a “new phase in the conflict.”

Fortunately, however, Washington has not coerced Jerusalem into ceasing the war since Alexander’s return. Nor, Diker observes, did the deal drive a wedge between the two allies, despite much speculation about the possibility.