Vienna’s grand boulevard, the Ringstrasse, which encircles the center of the city, was home to a large number of well-to-do Jewish families between its construction in the 1850s and the Nazi Anschluss in 1938. Reviewing a new exhibit on the lives of these families at Vienna’s Jewish museum, Liam Hoare writes:

Of the 55 percent of lots on the Ringstrasse that were acquired by private individuals, 44 percent had Jewish owners. Through rock and stone, construction of the Ringstrasse placed Jews at the heart of Viennese economic and cultural life. . . . A new synagogue, the Leopoldstädter Tempel, was built near the Ring in 1858. . . .

[The exhibit] focuses on the lives of this small band of wealthy Jewish families who made their home and their name on the Ring. A house here meant recognition and acceptance, which was achieved through a combination of political and religious liberalism, loyalty to Austria, and a tremendous contribution to the life of the city through patronage of the arts and sciences and charitable donations. . . .

These lush buildings, palaces for the Jewish bourgeoisie, cannot tell the full story of Vienna’s Jewish community during the golden age [of Austrian Jewry], though. While it was a period with many winners, others were not so fortunate. A swath of the Jewish population who arrived in Vienna from the rest of the empire in an attempt to escape the shtetl in the second half of the 19th century faced housing shortages and poverty, while being denied access to state aid.

The architecture also cannot capture what was going on in the wider society, namely, the growth of anti-Semitism in Viennese society that was a consequence of enlightenment, assimilation, and immigration. At the turn of the 20th century, the vile anti-Semite Karl Lueger (for whom a street in the city was named until as recently as April 2012) was mayor of Vienna.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.