The Anti-Semitic Legacy of Amin Haj al-Husseini

Amin Haj al-Husseini, who was appointed “grand mufti” of Jerusalem in 1921, gained infamy for his violent opposition to Zionism and his friendship with Heinrich Himmler. Boris Havel argues that Husseini also played an important role in bringing anti-Semitism to the Muslim world through such wartime works as the pamphlet Islam and Judaism:

[T]he pamphlet introduces [new ideas] into Islamic political discourse regarding the Jews. By combining the Islamic canon with pre-Christian and Christian anti-Judaism, it . . . [portrays Jews] as far more cunning and successful in their vicious designs than previous mainstream Islamic thought had recognized. . . . [One] example of this anti-Jewish eclecticism can be found in the mufti’s accusation that Jews brought plague to Arabia. This statement evokes medieval European myths with similar themes. . . .

[T]he mufti . . . traces Jewish accomplishments of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s . . . to supposed Jewish activities at the time of Muhammad. In doing so, he created a precedent later followed by prominent Islamic actors in the Middle East and elsewhere, particularly after Israel’s stunning military victories over its Arab adversaries. Thus Hamas accuses the Jews of “wiping out the Islamic caliphate” by starting World War I, starting the French and the Communist revolutions, establishing “clandestine organizations,” and [employing their] financial power to colonize, exploit, and corrupt countries.

Read more at Middle East Quarterly

More about: Anti-Semitism, Arab anti-Semitism, History & Ideas, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Nazis, Quran

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF