The late-19th-century German philosopher made his fair share of disparaging remarks about Jews and Judaism in his published and unpublished writings; far harsher, however, were his judgments about anti-Semites, Germans, and Christians. In a review of Nietzsche’s Jewish Problem, by Robert Holub, Brian Leiter defends the philosopher against the charge that anti-Semitism was integral to his thought:

Nietzsche’s target is obviously not the [Jewish or Christian] religion or the adherents [of either], but the values they embrace—the “ascetic” moralities . . . that denounce lust for sex, wealth, cruelty, and power, moralities characteristic of all the world’s major religions but unfamiliar in the ancient Greek and Roman world with which Nietzsche was deeply familiar. . . . Nietzsche, in fact, uses Judaism and Christianity interchangeably throughout the Genealogy of Morality: “everything is being made appreciably Jewish, Christian, or plebian (never mind the words!).”

He equates the “slave revolt” in morality—the overturning of the values of Greek and Roman antiquity with the values we now associate with “Judeo-Christian” morality—with the New Testament, with the Reformation, and with the triumph of the Catholic Pope in Rome. . . .

In his concluding chapter, Holub acknowledges that the real question is whether Nietzsche’s alleged Judeophobic comments are “concerned with issues of philosophical import” and thus should affect how we understand his philosophy. To answer this question, though, we need to be clearer . . . about what counts as objectionable Judeophobia. Surely it is wrongful to attack certain people based on negative stereotypes related to the religion they practice. . . . But is it similarly objectionable to be critical of a morality associated with Judaism (and Christianity, Islam etc.)? If so, then Nietzsche is not only a Judeophobe but a Christophobe, an Islamophobe, and so on. His entire corpus is an attack on values endorsed by the world’s major religions that he argues have pernicious psychological effects.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.