In the wake of the stabbing in Marseille of a Jewish teacher, the leader of the Jewish community has cautioned against wearing kippot in public. Citing this episode, Elliott Abrams recalls George Washington’s letter to the Jews of Newport in which the president expressed his hope that “the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in this land continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants—while ‘every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree and there shall be none to make him afraid’ [Micah 4:4].”

These sentences struck me today because they were true then for Jews in America and are true today, but were not true then for Jews in Europe and are not true [for them] today. . . .

Across Europe, Jews are being told by their own community leaders and rabbis to avoid showing any sign of their religion in public: no prayer shawl, no head covering, no Star of David necklace. Nothing. [It’s] too dangerous. . . .

It is in that context that Washington’s words are so striking. Two-hundred-and-twenty-five years later, Jews in Europe do not have the safety that America’s first president promised Jews in the United States in 1790. Nor is there much reason to think that the predicament of European Jews will be solved; indeed logic suggests that it will worsen. . . . “And there shall be none to make him afraid” is a promise that still eludes Jews in Europe.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.