According to recently declassified documents, representatives of the American president conducted behind-the-scenes talks with Iran’s soon-to-be supreme leader at the beginning of 1979—by which time the revolution against the shah’s rule had begun but Khomeini still remained in French exile. The U.S., wanting to forestall civil war in Persia, persuaded the Iranian military not to intervene against Khomeini’s return, believing—in a striking adumbration of recent events—that he would install a regime dominated by “moderates.” Kambiz Fattahi writes:

In a key meeting at the White House Situation Room on January, 11, 1979, the CIA predicted that Khomeini would sit back and let his moderate, Western-educated followers and his second-in-command, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, run the government. Beheshti was considered by U.S. officials to be a rare bird: a pragmatic, English-speaking cleric with a university education, experience of living in the West, and close ties to Khomeini. In short, he was someone with whom the Americans could reason. . . .

The Carter administration began secret talks with Khomeini with the primary objective of making an elusive deal between the ayatollah and the military. . . . Khomeini, [however], wanted a decisive victory, not a deal. But a tactical engagement with Washington suited him well. Khomeini, in fact, had a set of key questions to determine Carter’s commitment to the shah’s regime and the orientation of the Iranian military.

The ayatollah didn’t have to try very hard. America would easily reveal its hand. . . . [H]e received a clear signal that the U.S. considered the shah finished, and in fact was looking for a face-saving way to protect the military and avoid a Communist takeover. . . .

The Carter administration wanted to know about the future of U.S. core interests in Iran: American investments, oil flow, political-military relations, and views on the Soviet Union. Khomeini answered the questions in writing the next day . . . [with] an artfully-crafted portrait of an Islamic Republic . . . free of Soviet domination, neutral, if not friendly to America, one that would not export revolution, or cut oil flow to the West. . . .

Khomeini also vowed not to destabilize the region. “Non-interference in other people’s affairs,” he wrote, would be the policy of the future government. The Islamic Republic would not get into the business of exporting the revolution. . . .

Carter’s gambit proved to be a massive blunder. The real danger was overlooked, Khomeini’s ambitions were underestimated, and his moves were misread. . . . Less than a year later, Khomeini—while holding the U.S. charge d’affaires and dozens of other Americans during the Iranian hostage crisis—declared: “America can’t do a damn thing.” He then celebrated the first anniversary of his victory with a major proclamation: Iran was going to fight American imperialism worldwide. “We will export our revolution to the entire world,” he said.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.