According to recently declassified documents, representatives of the American president conducted behind-the-scenes talks with Iran’s soon-to-be supreme leader at the beginning of 1979—by which time the revolution against the shah’s rule had begun but Khomeini still remained in French exile. The U.S., wanting to forestall civil war in Persia, persuaded the Iranian military not to intervene against Khomeini’s return, believing—in a striking adumbration of recent events—that he would install a regime dominated by “moderates.” Kambiz Fattahi writes:
In a key meeting at the White House Situation Room on January, 11, 1979, the CIA predicted that Khomeini would sit back and let his moderate, Western-educated followers and his second-in-command, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, run the government. Beheshti was considered by U.S. officials to be a rare bird: a pragmatic, English-speaking cleric with a university education, experience of living in the West, and close ties to Khomeini. In short, he was someone with whom the Americans could reason. . . .
The Carter administration began secret talks with Khomeini with the primary objective of making an elusive deal between the ayatollah and the military. . . . Khomeini, [however], wanted a decisive victory, not a deal. But a tactical engagement with Washington suited him well. Khomeini, in fact, had a set of key questions to determine Carter’s commitment to the shah’s regime and the orientation of the Iranian military.
The ayatollah didn’t have to try very hard. America would easily reveal its hand. . . . [H]e received a clear signal that the U.S. considered the shah finished, and in fact was looking for a face-saving way to protect the military and avoid a Communist takeover. . . .
The Carter administration wanted to know about the future of U.S. core interests in Iran: American investments, oil flow, political-military relations, and views on the Soviet Union. Khomeini answered the questions in writing the next day . . . [with] an artfully-crafted portrait of an Islamic Republic . . . free of Soviet domination, neutral, if not friendly to America, one that would not export revolution, or cut oil flow to the West. . . .
Khomeini also vowed not to destabilize the region. “Non-interference in other people’s affairs,” he wrote, would be the policy of the future government. The Islamic Republic would not get into the business of exporting the revolution. . . .
Carter’s gambit proved to be a massive blunder. The real danger was overlooked, Khomeini’s ambitions were underestimated, and his moves were misread. . . . Less than a year later, Khomeini—while holding the U.S. charge d’affaires and dozens of other Americans during the Iranian hostage crisis—declared: “America can’t do a damn thing.” He then celebrated the first anniversary of his victory with a major proclamation: Iran was going to fight American imperialism worldwide. “We will export our revolution to the entire world,” he said.
Read more on BBC: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36431160