Last month, Israeli researchers discovered a telegram—dated to November 1943—from the SS chief Heinrich Himmler to the former grand mufti of Jerusalem Amin Haj al-Husseini, marking the anniversary of the 1917 Balfour Declaration and their shared hope for preventing its realization. Joel Fishman explains the telegram’s significance:

[Nazi Germany’s] alliance [with Husseini and his followers and supporters throughout the Arab world] was based on mutual support for the destruction of world Jewry, which both sides openly declared to be a shared interest and the basis of their friendship. The purpose of the telegram was to reaffirm publicly the existence of this partnership and the transaction it represented. Any discussion of Husseini’s ideological collaboration must also point out his remarkable claim that Nazism and Islam have a basic affinity. Examples of such shared values are the “Führer Principle,” discipline, and obedience which, according to him, find clear expression in the Quran. . . .

One should not overlook the essential fact that this ideological collaboration was reciprocal. The Nazi elite had a special respect and great admiration for Islam. Although these views have been documented, they have not yet been placed in context. . . . Heinrich Himmler’s doctor, Felix Kersten, wrote [in his postwar biography] an entire chapter on his patient’s “enthusiasm for Islam,” a chapter excluded from the English translation. According to Kersten, “Himmler saw Islam as a masculine, soldierly religion.” . . .

Beyond the discussion of Himmler’s telegram to Husseini, the basic challenge of honest history-writing is to place on the agenda the greater problem of Husseini’s partnership with Nazi Germany. . . . In Israel, part of the elite once argued that forgetting history is necessary in order to advance the cause of peace and understanding with the Palestinian Arabs. On the merits of the issue, it is unsound to argue that there is a virtue in preserving blank spots in our national history.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.