Between 1948 and 1967, the number of Jews living in Arab lands went from about 800,000 to a few thousand, most of whom lived in the larger cities of North Africa. The majority had left for Israel, France, or America in the face of increasing persecution. After the Six-Day War, however, life became untenable even for those who had remained behind. Lucette Lagnado writes:

That week in June—which sparked terrifying anti-Jewish riots, shop burnings, mass incarcerations, and even murders—eliminat[ed] any last lingering illusions these Jews may have held that they could stay put.

We know of course how multiple Arab armies who had expected to stamp out Israel were themselves crushed. It was all so humiliating. . . . [R]esidents of those countries chose to vent their rage by turning it against the Jews in their midst, most of who were studiously apolitical and had nothing to do with the war, its outbreak, or its outcome.

Even in those countries that were, as some of us like to say, “nice to the Jews”—such as Tunisia, where fairly sizable Jewish communities were left in 1967—there were terrifying demonstrations and expressions of hatred and venom. Jews from Morocco left in [a mass] exodus. In countries like Libya, murderous assaults took place that prompted an emergency evacuation of hundreds of Jews.

Egypt, where I was born and spent my early childhood, engaged in especially tawdry behavior. . . . On that week in 1967, the Egyptian government began rounding up Jewish men, to send to jails and prison camps. By accounts of the time, as many as 400 or 500 Jews were imprisoned. . . .

Perhaps that is why, whenever a supporter of the BDS movement targeting Israel insists they are “only” anti-Israel not anti-Jewish, I cast a cold eye, recalling how bogus that distinction turned out to be for Jews of Arab countries. It is as false now as it was 50 years ago.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.