According to the book of Kings, after Solomon’s death Jeroboam led the ten northern tribes of Israel to secede. To prevent his subjects from making pilgrimages to the Temple in Jerusalem, he
then set up two sanctuaries, one in the territory of Dan and another in Bethel—complete with golden calves, their own priests, and their own festival. Jonathan S. Greer explores what the archaeological record says about these sanctuaries:

[S]cholars have found subtle details suggesting that Jeroboam’s cult was traditional in nature [and may still have focused on the worship of biblical God]. His calves, many would argue, may be best understood as familiar Canaanite vehicles for the invisible deity enthroned above them. . . . His choice of the sites of Dan and Bethel, too, apparently reflected a sensitivity to honor venerable memories of a pre-monarchic past, [e.g., Jacob’s sojourn in Bethel recorded in Genesis]. . . .

On the one hand, excavations at the site of Tel Dan suggest a high degree of convergence between the finds and the biblical accounts. Excavations there have revealed a large Iron II [i.e., from the period between 1200 and 586 BCE] sacred precinct marked by temple-like architecture, cultic paraphernalia, the remains of what was likely a massive four-horned altar (based on comparative proportions, probably the largest in Israel), and animal-bone concentrations that suggest intensive sacrifice and sacred feasting. Further, many of the reconstructed practices of the Danite worshipers appear to be consistent with prescriptions found in biblical priestly texts.

Excavations at the site of Betin (which many identify as ancient Bethel), on the other hand, have not yielded a major sanctuary comparable to that at Dan from this time and show only sparse evidence for activity at the site in the early Iron II [period] and even less in the [subsequent] Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.